Language and cognition
We probably all share an interest in syntax, so we would dearly love a clear and certain answer to the question: what is syntactic structure like? Is it based on dependencies between words, or on phrases? What kinds of relation are there? And so on. But before we can answer relatively spe cific questions like these, we must first answer a much more general question: What kind of thing do we think language is? Or maybe: Where do we think language is -nowhere, in society, in our minds? Our answer will decide what basic assumptions we make, and how our discipline, linguistics, relates to other disciplines.
Is language a set of abstract patterns like those of mathematics, without any particular location? This is a popular answer, and makes a good deal of sense. After all, what is language if not ab stract patterning? The patterns made by words in a sentence, or by segments in a syllable, are cer tainly abstract and regular, and can be studied as a branch of mathematics -as indeed they have been studied and still are studied in linguistics. For some researchers who take this approach, the aim is elegance and consistency; so in a competi tion between alternative analyses, the prize goes to the simplest one. For others, though, the goal is a working computational system, so the crite rion is some kind of efficiency. One problem for this approach is that the material in which these patterns are embedded is inescapably human ac tivity; in contrast with mathematical patterns, lin guistic patterns only exist because humans create them. And another problem with the mathemati cal approach is that it provides few explanations for why language is as it is. If language patterns always turned out to be the most elegant possible patterns, the mathematical approach would in deed explain why; but they don't, and as we all know, language can be frustratingly messy.
Another possible answer is that language is a set of conventions that exist in society. For some linguists the social character of language is fun damental (Halliday and Matthiessen 2006) , and they like to focus on the role of language in 'con struing' experience. Language exists 'out there'in the community, as well as being shared by all its members; so the methods of sociology and cultural anthropology should apply. Simi larly, some sociolinguists see the social pattern ing of variation as belonging to the community, though not to any of its members (Labov 1972) . The trouble with this approach is that communi ties are much harder to define, and much less ho mogeneous, than we might expect; and once again, the basic data are irreducibly individual products -individuals speaking and listening to each other.
The third answer -and this is my preferred option -is that language is an example of indi vidual knowledge. As in the first answer, the knowledge involves mathematically expressible patterning; and as in the second, it has a strong social dimension -after all, we learn the knowl edge from others in our community, and we re veal our knowledge through our own social be haviour as speakers and listeners. But ultimately language is a matter of individual psychology. We learn it as individuals, we use it as individu als, and others know us, as individuals, through it. Who could deny this? And yet the other views of language have been very influential, and still are.
As an important example of its influence, take the criterion of elegance or simplicity. This is very widely accepted in linguistics, and those of us who support dependency structure might ar gue that one of the attractions of our approach, in contrast with phrase structure, is its simplicity. Just count the nodes! We have precisely one node per word, whereas a phrasestructure analy sis contains all these word nodes, plus extra nodes for the phrases. But is this criterion really relevant? If we were physicists, it certainly would be; but we aren't. We're studying a part of the human mind, and any human mind is the product of a long and complicated experience; so why should we believe that any mind is simple? As cognitive linguists argue, we learn our lan guage from 'usage' (Barlow and Kemmer 2000) -from the millions of examples of language that we hear, each embedded in a very specific social context. And we interpret each example in terms of the examples that went before, using a grow ing system of concepts. Nothing there is simple: for any given language, thousands or millions of speakers all follow different routes to a slightly different adult grammar, with numerous false starts and detours on the way. It's easy to under stand why linguists welcome the idea of a sim ple, perfect and uniform language as a way to es cape from this buzz of confusion and complexity. But, like the drunk looking for the keys that he has dropped, we have a choice: we can look un der the street lamp, where the light is good; or we can look over in the dark corner, where we know that we actually dropped the keys -a choice between esthetics and truth.
In short, I believe we have to accept that lan guage is part of cognition. And with that accep tance comes the principle that our theories of lan guage structure should be compatible with cogni tive science -in fact, our theories are part of cognitive science, and arguably a particularly im portant part of cognitive science, given the rela tive clarity and detail of the data found in lan guage. The reality that we are trying to capture in our theories is what is often called 'psychologi cal reality'. But, you may object, how can we know what is psychologically real? It's true that I can't even look inside my own mind, let alone inside some one else's mind; but then, psychology has moved a long way from the bad old days of introspec tion, and has findings which are supported by very robust experimental methods. The rest of this paper is an attempt to develop some of the consequences of taking these findings seriously when building models of language. I shall pay special attention to their consequences for my own theory, Word Grammar (WG, Hudson 1984 , Hudson 1990 , Hudson 2007 , Hudson 2010 , Gisborne 2010 , Eppler 2010 .
But before I go on to consider some of these findings, I must admit that there is a way to avoid my arguments. This is to claim that al though language is part of cognition, it is actu ally different from everything else -a unique 'module' of the mind (Chomsky 1986 , Fodor 1983 ). Our generative colleagues are free to in vent principles, parameters and structures at will, unconstrained by anything but their basic formal assumptions and the purely 'linguistic' facts. As you can guess, I don't think this is a good way to study language because I believe that language is, in fact, just like the rest of cognition in spite of all the attempts to show the contrary.
Some things we know about cognition
We start with four very elementary findings which can be found in introductory textbooks on cognitive psychology such as Reisberg (2007) , concerning networks, mental relations, complex ity and classification.
Knowledge is a network of concepts in which each concept is associated with a number of other concepts. These 'associations' explain why experiences evoke neighbouring memoriesmemories that share links (in the network) to the same concepts; why we make mistakes (includ ing speech errors) when we choose a neighbour ing concept in place of the intended target; and why an object in a psychological laboratory 'primes' objects that are its neighbours (as when hearing the word doctor makes the word nurse easier to retrieve than it would otherwise be). The notion of networks explains all these famil iar facts about cognition. But if knowledge in general is a network, and if language is part of knowledge, then language itself must be a net work. And that includes not only the whole of language -the grammar and phonology as well as the lexicon -but also the utterances that we interpret in terms of this network of knowledge.
But even though the notion of 'association' is important, we can be sure that the links in our mental network are not merely associations, but relations of many different kinds. Just think of all the words you know for kinship relationswords such as father, aunt and ancestor, each of which names a relationship. Then think of all the other persontoperson relationships you can name, including 'fatherinlaw', 'neighbour' and 'boss'? And then think of the prepositions and nouns you know for nonhuman relationships, such as beneath, opposite and consequence. The point is that we seem to be able to freely create and learn relational concepts, just as we do non relational concepts such as 'bird' and 'Londoner'. This conclusion takes us a long way from theories in which our minds recognise only a small, innate set of inbuilt relations called 'syn tactic functions' or 'semantic roles'. However, alongside these learnable relations there is at least one fundamental relation which may well be innate: what AI researchers often call 'isa', as in 'penguin isa bird', relating a subcategory to its 'supercategory'. This is the re lation that allows all generalisations, so it is bound to play an important part in any theory of cognition. Mental networks seem to be built round taxonomies of concepts related in this way, but with multiple other interrelations as well. Since this is such an important relation, it has its own special notation in WG: a small trian gle whose (large) base rests on the (large) super category and whose apex points at the subcate gory. This notation is illustrated in the taxonomy of my family members in Figure 1 .
The third relevant claim of elementary psychol ogy is that these knowledge networks can be very complex. This is clearly true of language, but other areas of knowledge also turn out to be astonishingly complex. Take once again the ex ample of kinship, as illustrated in Figure 2 by the male members of my immediate family.
The structure in Figure 2 is part of the same net work as that in Figure 1 , and like this, it must be part of my cognition because every bit of it is something I know. I know all the people named in the square boxes, and I know how they are (or were) related to each other. Even this tiny frag ment of my total knowledge illustrates some im portant formal properties of the human cognitive network:
• Relations aren't merely 'associations', but are classified (as 'father', 'son' and so on).
• Relations are asymmetrical, in the sense that each one consists of an 'argument' and a 'value' (so the 'son' relation near the top of the diagram has William as its argument and John as its value, showing that John is William's son). In the notation that I use in this diagram (and indeed in later ones), the ar row points towards the value.
• • Relations may be recursive. The relevant ex ample here is 'ancestor', which has a recursive definition (A is the ancestor of B either if A is a parent of B, or if A is a parent of an ancestor of B). These formal properties can be described mathe matically, but the one thing they don't do is to limit the space of possibilities: almost anything seems to be possible. This is a very different ap proach to formal structures compared with the familiar aim of explaining grammars by limiting their formal properties.
The fourth important fact about cognition is that classification ('categorization') is based on prototypes -typical cases where a bundle of properties (such as beaks, two legs, flying, feath ers and laying eggs which define the typical bird) coincide -with other cases (such as nonflying birds) arranged round these typical ones as more or less exceptional or unclear examples. This way of organising knowledge requires a special kind of logic, called 'default inheritance', in which generalisations apply 'by default', but can be overridden.
It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that our minds are capable of handling complex net works in which there are at least two kinds of re lations between nodes: the basic 'isa' relation of categorization and default inheritance, and an openended list of relational concepts which are created as needed and learned in the same way as other concepts. This is the mental machinery that we can, and indeed must, assume when building our theories of how language is organisedagain, a very different starting point from the rather simple and sparse assumptions behind most of the familiar theories in either the PS or DS families.
Dependencies and phrases
These assumption are directly relevant to the de bate between PS and DS. The question is how we represent the words in a sentence to ourselves: do we represent them as parts to larger wholes (phrases), or do our mental representations link them directly to one another? For example, is cows in (1) related only to the phrase cows moo, or is it related directly to moo?
(1) Cows moo.
The PS answer evolved out of Wundt's rather impoverished theory of cognition which concen trated on the relation between a whole 'idea' and its immediate parts -the origins of Bloomfield's Immediateconstituent analysis, which in turn led to Chomsky's Phrase structure (Percival 1976) . PS analysis rests crucially on the assumption that the wholepart relation between a phrase and its parts is the only possible relation (although of course even PS users talk informally about de pendencies such as 'longdistance dependen cies').
But the evidence from section 2 shows that the human mind, which creates sentence structure, can handle much, much more complicated struc tures than wholepart relations. Just think of my family. If we assume, as surely we must, that the full power of the human mind is available for language, and if we can handle direct relations between people then surely we can also handle direct DS relations between words. Moreover, this conclusion confirms what grammarians have been saying for two thousand years about va lency links between words. In the fourth century BC, Panini showed the need for semantic rela tions between verbs and their arguments, and in the second century AD Apollonius pointed out how verbs and prepositions required their objects to have different case inflections (Robins 1967:37) . Since then, and through the Arabic grammarians and our Middle Ages up to recent times, these semantic and syntactic links between words have been a regular part of a grammar ian's work. It seems very clear, therefore, that our minds are not only capable of recognising wordword dependencies, but actually do recog nise them. And in our example, we can be sure that cows and moo are held together by a direct bond which explains why moo has no {s} (in contrast with the cow moos).
But where does that leave the notion of phrase? Evidence in favour of wordword rela tions is not in itself evidence against wholepart relations. By recognising a dependency between cows and moo, are we also recognising a larger unit, cows moo? Here the answer is much less clear, at least to me even after nearly forty years of thinking about it. But I am sure of three things.
• The larger unit, if it exists, is no more than the sum of its parts, because all of its propertiesits meaning, its syntactic classification and so on -are the properties of its head word. (I ex plain in section 8 how the head word carries the meaning of the whole phrase.)
• The larger unit does have boundaries, which certainly are relevant at least for punctuation which marks phrase boundaries: Cows moo.
No doubt the same is true of intonation. And in phonology and morphology, it is widely ac cepted that some phenomena are limited to the 'edges' of constituents (Hyman 2008) . But maybe that's all there is to a phrase: just its boundaries.
• Unary branching -where a phrase has just one constituent -is where PS is most vulnerable. If we say that cows is a noun phrase consisting of a single word, then we are stretching the notion of 'part' beyond its limit. The fact is, or seems to me to be, that we don't normally al low objects to have just one part. For instance, if a box normally has a lid, but we lose the lid, we don't think of the box as having one part. What would that part be, other than the box it self? But if we forbid unary branching, we lose one of the main supposed benefits of phrases, which is to allow generalisations across complex phrases and single words (so that cows, brown cows and even they count as 'noun phrases'). In short, we can be much more sure about the mental existence of wordword dependencies than about that of phrases; but we're certainly ca pable of recognising wholepart relations, so we can't rule them out altogether. The result is that we certainly need an analysis like the righthand one in Figure 3 , but we may also need to include the lefthand structure. (I discuss the unorthodox DS notation below.)
Bundles or levels?
Dependencies do many different jobs, from car rying 'deep' information such as semantic roles to carrying more 'surface' information such as word order and inflectional categories. More over, dependency relations can be classified in terms of familiar syntactic functions such as 'subject', whose definitions typically span a range of different kinds of information from deep to surface (Keenan 1976) . One major theoretical question for DS analysis is what to do with this diversity of information 'carried' by dependen cies. As so often in theoretical questions, we find 'splitters' and 'lumpers' -those who split depen dencies into different types according to the in formation they carry, and those who lump the different relations together. Once again, our cog nitive assumptions throw important light on the question.
Remember that relational concepts (such as dependencies) are concepts, so like other con cepts, their main function is to bring together properties that tend to combine. For instance, the relation 'father' brings together biological prop erties (procreation) with social properties (parental rights and responsibilities), just as the closely related concept 'male' does. Splitters might argue that the biological and social are im portantly different, so they should be separated to give 'bfather', carrying the biological proper ties, and 'sfather' with the social ones. But lumpers would argue -rightly, in my opinionthat this misses the point. After all, the two prop ertysets tend to coincide, so even if you distin guish two kinds of father, you also need some mechanism to show the special connection be tween them. So why not simply call them both 'father', and allow the 'father' prototype to have both sets of properties? The existence of excep tional cases (men who father children without looking after them, or vice versa) is easily ac commodated thanks to the logic of default inheri tance.
Exactly the same argument supports the lumpers in syntax against those who favour sepa rating 'deep' dependents from more 'surface' ones, as in the separation of semantic, syntactic and morphological dependencies in Mean ingText Theory (Mel'cuk 2003) . So for instance between cows and moo, we can recognise a sin gle dependency which is classified as 'subject' and carries a wide assortment of information about the two words and their relationship. Of course this is not to deny that a word is different both from its meaning and from its realization in morphology; even lumpers should not be tempted to blur these distinctions. But these other levels of structure are among the typical proper ties that can be predicted from the syntactic de pendency: one dependency, many properties. The kind of analysis I have in mind can be seen in Figure 4 , where once again I use a nonstan dard notation for DS which I justify below. The main point about this diagram is that the relation labelled 'subject' allows the prediction ('inheri tance') of at least three very different properties:
• the semantic relation labelled 'actor'
• the word order
• the numberagreement.
Mutual dependency
Another question for DS theory is how rich DS is; and the answer that I shall suggest will also explain why I use nonstandard notation. The standard answer is that DS is about as rich as very elementary PS -in short, very poor. This is the assumption behind the early arguments that DS and PS are equivalent (Gaifman 1965 ), but of course there is no reason to accept the assump tion; indeed, what we know about cognition sug gests just the opposite. If our minds are capable of representing complex social structures, then why should the same not be true of syntactic structures?
Take the case of mutual relations such as the relations between me and my father (whereby he is my father and I am his son). All the standard assumptions about syntax rule out the possibility of mutual dependency, but as Mel'cuk com ments, mutual government clearly does exist in some languages (Mel'cuk 2003) . For example, a Russian numeral such as dva, 'two', requires a singular genitive noun, but its gender is deter mined by the noun; so in dva stola, 'two tables', stola is genitive singular because of dva, but dva is masculine because of stola. More familiar data confirms this conclusion. Consider (2).
(2) Who came?
Who clearly depends, as subject, on came, in just the same way that cows depends on moo in (1). But the reverse is also true: came depends on who by virtue of the latter being an interrogative pronoun. This is what allows who came to de pend on a verb such as wonder: Facts such as these show strongly that interroga tive pronouns (such as who) take a finite verb (such as came) as an optional complement. But we also know that who depends on came, so we have a very clear case of mutual dependency.
Mutual dependency cannot be shown in any standard notation, whether for PS or for DS, be cause these notations all use the vertical dimen sion for dominance. The problem is that mutual dependency means mutual dominance, and verti cality does not allow two objects each to be higher than the other. This is why I prefer in WG to use arrows, where the direction of dominance is shown by the arrowhead (which more gener ally distinguishes values from arguments). In this notation, then, the structure of (2) is shown in Figure 5 .
More about cognition: logic and to kens
We now return to consider another feature of general cognition: nodecreation. This is the idea that we create mental nodes to represent the tokens of ongoing experience (which psycholo gists call 'exemplars'). For example, when I see an object in the sky, I first create a token node for that object and then try to enrich it by linking it to some stored node (what linguists call a 'type'), such as the 'bird' node from which it can inherit further properties. The token needs a node to itself, most obviously at the point in process ing where it hasn't yet been assigned to a type. Moreover the token has properties of its own, such as its unique position in space and time. Be cause no single node can carry two different sets of properties, we must create a token node which will eventually be classified by an isa link to some type which effectively integrates the token temporarily into the total network. This system for handling tokens by creating temporary nodes may seem rather obvious and trivial, but it has important ramifications for my argument below so it is worth pursuing a little.
• The main consequence is that one token may act as supercategory for another; for instance, suppose I see a small yellow bird, for which I create node A1, and then I see another one, and create node A2. The very act of recognis ing A2 as 'another one' means that I register its similarities to A1, with A1 as the supercate gory for A2, and I can recognise this link even if I don't know how to classify A1. The same is true whenever we create one token as a copy of another (as in games such as 'Follow my leader', where everyone does the same as the leader). Thus two distinct objects or events may be linked by isa even though they are both only temporary tokens.
• But multiple tokens are possible even for sin gle objects or events. For example, suppose I create node B for a rather nondescript brown bird which I can't classify, and then, minutes later, I see another bird of similar size hopping around near the first bird, for which I create node C. From its colour I know that C is a blackbird, so I assume that B is its mate, and is also a blackbird; but I can also remember my original failure to classify B, so I need a sepa rate node for the newly classified B, which we may call B*. We might say that blackbird C has 'modified' B into B* -an example of one concept's properties being affected by those of a related concept.
• Another possibility is where we predict one to ken as part of the enrichment for another to ken. For example, suppose I see a duck swim ming in a pond, and wonder where its nest is. This mental operation presupposes two nodes, D1 for the duck and N1 for its nest. Now sup pose I think the typical relation between a duck and its nest is for the duck to be sitting on the nest; thanks to default inheritance, I ex pect D1 to be sitting on N1. But of course this is wrong, because D1 is actually swimming in the pond. I then spot a nest N2 with another duck D2 sitting on it, and, putting two and two together, I work out that D1 is D2's mate, and N2 is their shared nest. In other words, the ex pected N1 (the nest I expect D1 to be sitting on) is actually D2, which is in the expected re lation to D2 but not to D1. Once again, default inheritance provides precisely the right analy sis if we recognise N2 as a 'subcategory' of N1 -the actual nest that N1 was meant to an ticipate. All these examples are brought together in Fig  ure 6 , where the greyed boxes indicate perma nent types and the others are temporary tokens. The main point of this figure is to show that an isa relation is possible between one token and another, as in A1A2, BB* and N1N2.
Structure sharing, raising and lower ing
Returning to syntax, let's assume that the mental resources we can apply to birds are also available for words. Let's also assume, with Tree Adjoin ing Grammar, that a dependency grammar con sists of 'elementary dependency trees anchored on lexical items' (Joshi and Rambow 2003) . For example, by default inheritance the word token moo has a subject, in just the same way that a duck has a nest, and in processing this bit of ex perience we have to identify the expected subject or nest with some other token. And of course in both cases the expected token has a 'valency' of its own: the nest needs an owner, and the noun needs a 'parent' word to depend on. In fact, just the same process lies behind the classification of the tokens: so each token starts with an unknown supercategory which has to be identified with a known type. The little grammar in Figure 7 shows these identifications by the '=' linking the expected but unknown '?' to its target.
This much is probably common ground among DS grammarians. But an important question arises for DS theory: how many parents can one word have? Once again, the standard answer is very simple: one -just the same answer as in PS theory, where the 'single mother condition' is widely accepted (Anderson 1979 , Zwicky 1985 . But syntactic research over the last few decades has produced very clear evidence that a word may in fact depend on more than one other word. For example, 'raising' structures such as (5) con tain a word which is the subject of two verbs at the same time.
(5) It keeps raining.
In this example, it must be the subject of keepsfor example, this is the word that keeps agrees with. But equally clearly, it is the subject of raining, as required by the restriction that the subject of the verb RAIN must be it. Some PS theories (such as HPSG) allow 'structure shar ing', which is equivalent to recognising two 'mothers' (Pollard and Sag 1994:4) ; and this has always been possible in WG. Once again, the ar row notation helps, as in Figure 8 (which I am about to revise):
DS provides a very good framework for dis cussing structure sharing because it reveals a very general 'triangle' of dependencies which re curs in every example of structure sharing: three words connected by dependencies so that one of the sharing parents depends on the other. In this example, it depends both on keeps and on rain ing, but raining also depends on is. We might call these words the 'shared' (it), the 'higher par ent' (keeps) and the 'lower parent' (raining). But the existence of two parents in structure sharing raises a problem. What happens if their parental 'rights' conflict? For example, since it depends on raining, these two words ought to be next to each other, or at least not separated by a word such as keeps which does not depend on ei ther of them; but putting it next to raining would produce *Keeps it raining, which is ungrammati cal. The general principle that governs almost ev ery case of structure sharing is that the higher parent wins; we might call this the 'raising' prin ciple. But how can we build this principle into the grammar so that raising is automatic?
The answer I shall offer now is new to WG, and builds on the earlier discussion of tokens in cognition, where I argued that one token may take another token as its supercategory. It also develops the idea that each token inherits a 'typi cal' underlying structure such as the 'tectogram matical' representations of Functional Generative Description (Sgall and others 1986) . Suppose that both the verbs in It keeps raining inherit a normal subject, which by default should be next to them: it keeps and it raining. But suppose also that the two it's are distinct tokens linked by isa, so that it, the subject of keeps, isa it*, the sub ject of raining. Formally, this would be just like the relation between nest N2 and nest N1 in Fig  ure 6 , and the logic of default inheritance would explain why it1 wins in the conflict over position in just the same way that it explains why N2 is under a duck but N1 isn't.
This answer requires a change in the analysis of Figure 8 , which follows the tradition of WG (and also of other theories such as HPSG). In fact, if anything it is more similar to a Chom skyan analysis with 'traces', where the trace shows the expected position. But unlike the Chomskyan analysis, this does not involve any notion of 'movement'; all it involves is the ordi nary logic of default inheritance. The structure I am now suggesting is shown in Figure 9 .
Why do languages and their speakers prefer rais ing to its opposite, lowering? I believe there is an easy functional explanation if we think of gram matical dependencies as tools for providing each word with an 'anchor' in the sentence which is in some sense already more integrated than the de pendent. Clearly, from this point of view the higher parent must be more integrated than the lower parent, so it provides a better anchor for the shared. I think we can rely on this functional explanation to explain why our linguistic ances tors developed the raising principle and why we so easily learned it; so there is no need to assume that it is innate.
Which is just as well, because there are clear exceptions to the raising principle. In some lan guages, there are constructions where it is the lower parent that wins -in other words, cases of 'lowering'. For example, German allows 'partial VP fronting' as in (6) (Uszkoreit 1987 , Haider 1990 ).
(6) Eine Concorde gelandet ist hier noch nie. 'A Concorde hasn't yet landed here.'
There is overwhelming evidence that eine Con corde is the subject of both gelandet and ist, but it is equally clear that it takes its position from the nonfinite, and dependent, gelandet rather than from the finite ist. In this case, then, the ex pected raising relation is reversed, so that the subject of the lower parent isa that of the higher parent, and the lower parent (gelandet) wins.
Moreover, German isn't the only language with lowering. Sylvain Kahane has drawn my at tention to apparently lowered examples in French such as (7), which are easy to find on the inter net.
(7) Avezvous lu la lettre qu'a écrite Gilles à Pauline? 'Have you read the letter which Gilles wrote to Pauline?'
The important thing here is that Gilles is the sub ject of both the auxiliary a ('has') and its com plement, the verb écrite (written), but it takes its position among the dependents of the latter, which is the lower parent.
It would seem, then, that sharing usually in volves raising, but can involve lowering; and if raising has functional benefits, then presumably lowering also has benefits, even if the attractions of raising generally win out. And of course the two patterns can coexist in the same language, so we may assume that learners of German and French can induce the generalisation shown in Figure 10 , with the general raising pattern shown as the ABCA* configuration, and the excep tional lowering one as DEFD*.
Once again, the main point is that we can ana lyse, and perhaps even explain, the most abstract of syntactic patterns if we assume that the full apparatus of human cognition is available for learning language.
One of the challenges for the very 'flat' struc tures of DS is to explain examples like (8) (Dahl 1980 (Hudson 1990:146151) , but I can now offer a better anal ysis which builds, once again, on the possibility of multiple tokens for one word.
This problem is actually a particular case of a more general problem: how to allow dependents to modify the meaning of the 'parent' word (the word on which they depend) -for example, how to show that French house doesn't just mean 'house', but means 'French house'. In PS analy sis, the answer is easy because the node for the phrase French house is different from that for house, so it can carry a different meaning. I an ticipated the solution to this problem in section 6 when I was discussing the case of the unclassifi able bird turning out to be a blackbird. In that discussion I said that the male bird 'modified' the classification of the other bird, deliberately using the linguistic term for the effect of a de pendent on the meaning of its parent.
Suppose we assign the word token house not one node but two, just as I suggested we might do with the female blackbird. One node carries the properties inherited directly from the type HOUSE, including the meaning 'house', and the other, which of course isa the first, shows the modifying effect of the dependent French, giving the meaning 'French house'. My suggestion is that modification works cumulatively by creating a new word token for each dependent. If this is right, then we have an explanation for typical French house, because 'French house' is the meaning which typical modifies. One challenge for this analysis is to find suitable names for the word tokens, but there is a simple solution: to name each token by a combination of the head word and the dependent concerned: househouse+French -house+typical.
This multiplication of word tokens would also explain many other things, such as why the anaphoric ONE can copy either meaning of a phrase such as French house as in (9) and (10). Once again the challenge for DS is how a single word token (house) can simultaneously mean ei ther 'house' or 'French house'. But if house and house+French are actually different tokens, the problem disappears. Moreover, this example also reminds us that anaphora essentially involves the copying of one word token's properties onto an other -in other words, an isa relation between two word tokens, further evidence that one token may act as a supercategory for another. The rela tions in (9) and (10) are displayed in Figure 11 .
This general principle has the interesting conse quence of greatly reducing the difference be tween DS and PS. Both analyses assign an extra node to any word for each dependent that that word has, and assign to that node the modified meaning as affected by the dependent. The simi larities are illustrated in Figure 12 .
Nevertheless, important differences remain: DS allows structures that are impossible in PS, in cluding mutual dependencies, and conversely, PS allows structures that are impossible in DS, in cluding not only unary branching but also exo centric constructions (even if these are excluded by the Xbar principle -Jackendoff 1977). And most importantly, the relevant relations are logi cally very different: the wholepart relation in PS, and the supercategorysubcategory relation in DS.
